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As the Brexit dust settles, what is the English Court doing about jurisdiction disputes?

  • United Kingdom
  • Brexit
  • International arbitration
  • Litigation and dispute management


Executive Summary

In the months leading up to the 31 December 2020 when the UK left the EU, there was much speculation about the effectiveness of choice of jurisdiction clauses, the approach that the English Courts would adopt and the fate of unilateral clauses that gave one party the right to chose between Court proceedings and arbitration.

The decisions of the English Courts on these issues since 1 January 2021 suggest:

A.    When faced with actual or potential near parallel proceedings in another jurisdiction, the English will support the continuation of the proceedings before it. Faced with a risk of parallel or near parallel proceedings, a party should not only look to seize first their court of choice but, also, consider the extent and nature of the claim that they bring in order to have the best chance of their choice prevailing over any attempt by their counterparty to have another Court seized of jurisdiction.

B.    The English Court continues to take a pro-active approach to supporting arbitration and will tightly construe provisions that give a party an option to take a dispute to Court. Users of dispute resolution clauses that provide a unilateral option to go to Court should review their precedent clauses in light of the latest judgments of the English Court that are considered below.

This article considers the English Courts decisions in detail and the particular points that can be taken from them.

I. Introduction

Following the end of the Brexit Implementation Period, the English Court’s interpretation of the rules which govern its jurisdiction and enforcement in cross-border commercial disputes after 1 January 2021 was highly anticipated.

This first quarter of 2021 witnessed a prolific court activity in relation to these issues. In this article, we propose to take a closer look at four decisions where English courts had to rule on its jurisdiction in the context of:

i.    the existence of an exclusive choice of courts agreement (Motacus Constructions Limited v Paolo Castelli S.P.A. [2021] EWHC 356);

ii.   the interpretation of Article 27 of the Lugano Convention and whether a claim for negative declaratory relief in Norway prevents a subsequent and parallel libel claim from proceeding in England & Wales (Craig Wright v Magnus Granath [2021] EWCA 28);

iii.  whether English court proceedings should be stayed in favour of arbitration proceedings pursuant to the arbitration agreement contained in the contract that is subject to the dispute (Helice Leasing S.A.S v PT Garuda Indonesia (Persero) TbK (Rev 1) [2021] EWHC 99); and

iv.  conflicting dispute resolution clauses in a single contract (AdActive Media Inc v Ingrouille [2021] EWCA Civ 313 (05 March 2021)).

A. Motacus Constructions Limited v Paolo Castelli S.P.A.

On 22 February 2021, the Manchester’s High Court in Motacus Constructions Limited v Paolo Castelli SPA ruled on the “apparently novel” question of whether the inclusion within a construction contract, for works in England, of an exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of a foreign court precludes the English court from entertaining proceedings for breach of an implied term that the decision of an adjudicator binds the parties until the final determination of the dispute. According to Judge Hodge QC, this question has not previously been the subject of any authoritative decision of the courts and it is not considered in the leading work on the subject, Coulson on Construction Adjudication, 4th ed (2018).

In summary, the Court held that the Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements (“2005 Hague Convention”) did not apply, and that it could accept jurisdiction and enforce the adjudicator’s decision by granting summary judgment, because that decision was an interim measure of protection within the meaning of art. 7 of the 2005 Hague Convention. The parties still have the opportunity to litigate the underlying dispute before the Paris Courts, pursuant to the choice of court clause included in their contract.


The underlying dispute arose out a supply and installation agreement dated 23 May 2019 between Motacus (the claimant) and Paolo Castelli SPA (the defendant), relating to the defendant’s works to One Bishopsgate Plaza Hotel in London. The claimant was retained by the defendant to supply and install a variety of equipment and paintings.

Clause 19 of the contract provided for the exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts of Paris, France. A dispute arose as to sums due under the contract and the claimant issued a notice of adjudication on 27 October 2020. The adjudicator issued his award on 15 December 2020. He awarded payment of £454,678.65 plus VAT and interest. Payment was ordered to be made by 22 December 2020 but it has not been made.

An adjudication enforcement claim was issued on 12 January 2021. On the same day, HHJ Stephen Davies issued standard form directions in adjudication enforcement proceedings giving the claimant permission to issue an application for summary judgment prior to service by the defendant of either an acknowledgment of service or a defence and giving directions to lead to the hearing of such an application on 15 February 2021.

The parties’ arguments

The Parties’ case rested on the proper interpretation of articles 6(c) and 7 of the 2005 Hague Convention which read as follows:

Article 6(c)

A court of a Contracting State other than that of the chosen court shall suspend or dismiss proceedings to which an exclusive choice of court agreement applies unless -


c) giving effect to the agreement would lead to a manifest injustice or would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the State of the court seised;”

Article 7

Interim measures of protection are not governed by this Convention. This Convention neither requires nor precludes the grant, refusal or termination of interim measures of protection by a court of a Contracting State and does not affect whether or not a party may request or a court should grant, refuse or terminate such measures.

The claimant’s case was that the English court should accept jurisdiction and enforce the adjudicator’s decision, notwithstanding the exclusive jurisdiction clause, in light of the provisions in either art. 6(c) or art. 7 of the 2005 Hague Convention. The Claimant argued that it would be manifestly contrary to the public policy enshrined in the 1996 Act, or alternatively it would be manifestly unjust, to refuse to enforce an otherwise enforceable adjudicator’s decision in reliance on clause 19 of the contract. In addition, and in any event, the enforcement of an adjudicator’s decision is the enforcement of an interim measure of protection, which falls outside the scope of the 2005 Hague Convention and so the defendant cannot rely on its provisions.

The defendant argued that the English courts do not have jurisdiction to determine the claimant’s request for summary judgment, which has been brought in breach of the exclusive jurisdiction clause agreed between the parties as set out at clause 19 of the construction contract. Pursuant to art. 6 of the 2005 Hague Convention, the English Court must “suspend or dismiss” these proceedings. The relevant question for the English Judge is whether the enforcement of the defendant’s alleged breach of the adjudicator’s decision should take place in England or in France. The parties agreed in clause 19 of the contract that all disputes arising out of their contract must be settled by the courts of Paris, France.

The Decision of the Court

The judgment was handed down by Judge Hodge QC who found that the English Courts were asked to grant an interim, rather than a final remedy. His decision is consistent with MBE Electrical Contractors Ltd v Honeywell Control Systems Ltd [2010] EWHC 2244 (TCC). which is authority for where a contract contains an arbitration clause, the “pay now, argue later” policy of the Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996 (“HGCRA”) requires the enforcement by the courts of the interim adjudicator’s award before the final determination by the chosen forum. The whole purpose of the HGCRA is to ensure that the adjudicator’s decision is binding until it is successfully challenged by arbitration or in court. As a result, the summary judgement was granted to the claimant.

On the interpretation of Article 6(c) of the 2005 Hague Convention, Judge Hodge QC found that The burden rests on the claimant to persuade the court that one or other (or both) of the two limbs of that article is engaged. In Judge Hodge QC’s view, for the court to give effect to the exclusive jurisdiction clause in this construction contract would not lead to any “manifest injustice”; nor would it be “manifestly contrary to the public policy” of the United Kingdom.

The Judge held that the claimant has not exceeded the high threshold required for this exception to be engaged. If Parliament considers that the cashflow problems affecting the construction industry, and the consequent need to address this problem by way of a speedy mechanism for settling disputes in construction contracts on a provisional, and interim, basis, warrant a derogation from the binding character accorded to an exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of a foreign court so as to enable an adjudicator’s decision to be enforced in the English and Welsh (or Scottish) courts, then it will need to make a declaration in respect of construction contracts under and in accordance with art. 21 of the 2005 Hague Convention. The claimant has not satisfied the Court that it would be contrary to public policy, or unjust, (let alone manifestly so) to require the claimant to enforce its adjudication award in the courts of Paris, France.

On the interpretation of Article 7 of the 2005 Hague Convention, Judge Hodge QC found that the adjudication process is “sui generis” in the sense that it is the only one of its kind. But it may be considered analogous to an order for the interim delivery up of goods or other property, or a mandatory interim injunction to allow an occupier of property back into possession pending the final determination of the substantive dispute between the parties.

The Judge held that the concept of an interim protective measure extends to a decision of an adjudicator which, by the operation of the HGCRA and related scheme, is not final and binding on the parties. The function of the adjudicator’s decision is to protect the position of the successful party on an interim basis pending the final resolution of the parties’ dispute through the normal court processes (or by arbitration). Whilst summary judgment is clearly a final and conclusive remedy, the Judge agreed with the Claimant’s submission that the reality of this summary judgment application is that the court is being invited to grant an interim, rather than a final and conclusive, remedy. What is before this court is not the underlying dispute between these parties but whether an interim procedure and remedy have been followed and granted.


The decision in Motacus Constructions Limited v Paolo Castelli S.P.A. provides important clarity regarding the scope articles 6(c) and 7 of the Hague Convention and the distinction between what constitutes interim protective measures and final and conclusive remedy. More importantly, it provides commercial certainty and comfort for businesses operating in the construction industry that adjudicator’s decisions will be enforced by English Courts notwithstanding the existence of an exclusive choice of courts situated in another state.

More generally, in these circumstances the English was willing to proceed and not cede the jurisdiction it had as a consequence of the 1996 Act to the Court named in the exclusive jurisdiction clause. The judgment also preserves the English Court’s position of being prepared to act to grant interim remedies, the scope of which under Part 25 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 is extensive.

B. Craig Wright v Magnus Granath

On 15 January 2021, the Court of Appeal of England & Wales in Craig Wright v Magnus Granath ruled on the interpretation of Article 27 of the Lugano Convention, and whether a claim for negative declaratory relief in Norway prevents a subsequent and parallel libel claim from proceeding in England & Wales.

The case related to an appeal against the High Court Judge’s decision (based on Article 27 of the Lugano Convention) to decline jurisdiction on the grounds that the cause of action in the English court proceedings was the same as that in prior proceedings brought in Norway for negative declaratory relief, of which the Norwegian Court was first seised. The issues on before the Court of Appeal were (1) whether article 27 applies to these defamation claims; and (2) if so, whether the causes of action in the two sets of proceedings are the same.


This is a dispute between an England-based computer scientist, Mr Craig Wright (the Claimant/Appellant) claiming to be the inventor of Bitcoin and a Norwegian man, Mr Magnus Granath (the defendant/Respondent), questioning Mr Wright’s assertion which he publicly described as “fraudulent” on Twitter.

Shortly after being threatened with a court action by Mr Wright’s lawyers, in May 2019, Mr Granath initiated proceedings before the Oslo District Court seeking a declaration of non-liability (“the Norwegian Claim”). A few months later, Mr Wright, in turn, decided to file a claim before the English Courts seeking damages for libel in relation to the tweet published by Mr Granath. The Oslo Court found that it had jurisdiction over Mr Granath’s claim, and Mr Wrights’ subsequent appeals before the Borgarting Court of Appeal and Supreme Court were dismissed.

The parties’ arguments before the English Courts centred around the scope of Article 27 of the Lugano Convention and whether this article applied to the defamation claims in both Norway and England. Article 27 reads as follows:

1.  Where proceedings involving the same cause of action and between the same parties are brought in the courts of different States bound by this Convention, any court other than the court first seised shall of its own motion stay its proceedings until such time as the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established.

2.   Where the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established, any court other than the court first seised shall decline jurisdiction in favour of that court.”

The English High Court applied article 27 to decline jurisdiction on the grounds that the cause of action in these proceedings was the same as that in proceedings brought in Norway for negative declaratory relief, of which the Norwegian Court was first seised.

The Parties’ arguments before the English Court of Appeal

The claimant argued that the English and Norwegian claims neither have the same cause nor the same “objet”.

The Claimant argued that in order to establish identity of cause of action within article 27, it is necessary that there be complete overlap in the issues in each set of proceedings; and/or there must be irreconcilability as a necessary consequence of the two claims proceeding, in the sense of cause of action estoppel. These conditions were not met in this case as there were a number of differences between the English and Norwegian claims, which pertain to the elements of the causes of action (e.g. dishonesty is an issue in the English claim bit not in the Norwegian claim; and that the Norwegian claim requires proof of negligence under Norwegian law, whereas the English tort of defamation is one of presumed malice which does not require the proof of a mental element).

In addition, the claims do not have the same “objet”. In particular, the Norwegian Claim is for a declaration that Mr Granath is not liable to pay damages and is therefore concerned with insulation against financial liability; by contrast, the English Claim is concerned with vindication of Dr Wright’s reputation rather than pecuniary relief. Damages are not the primary relief sought; the primary relief sought in the English Claim is non-pecuniary, namely the injunction.

On the other hand, the defendant argued that there is complete overlap between the issues in the two sets of proceedings. The defendant’s position is that what is necessary to fulfil the requirement of same cause was identity at a high level of abstraction. In other words, it is sufficient in this case that both claims raise the question whether Mr Granath defamed Dr Wright and damaged his reputation by publishing the tweet. The rule of law involved in both is protection of personalities from false statements.

The defendant also argued that it is also sufficient if there is a single common issue which is an essential ingredient of the cause of action in each claim, because that gives rise to a risk of irreconcilable judgments which it is the purpose of article 27 to prevent. Any such risk engages article 27.

The Decision of the Court of Appeal

The majority of the Court of Appeal decided to allow the appeal on the basis that article 27 of the Lugano Convention does not apply because the proceedings in Norway and England do not involve the same cause of action.

On the scope of Article 27, the majority held that the test in article 27 is intended to be a closely defined one which does not require an extensive enquiry but simply the determination of whether proceedings have the same cause of action and the same object. In this case, writing for the majority, Moylan LJ held that the causes of action in the English and Norwegian proceedings do not mirror each other such that they are legally irreconcilable. In his view, the Norwegian claim, based on the Damages Compensation Act 1969, clearly included one legal element which did not feature in the English proceedings, namely whether the allegations were or were not made negligently. This did not form part of or feature in the English proceedings.

Dissenting from the majority in Friday's decision, Andrew Popplewell LJ said that the test under Article 27 did not mean that a party should establish that the two claims were exactly the same in every respect. Andrew Popplewell LJ noted that that when considering the “objet”, the search is not for complete identity, but for identity on a question “which lies at the heart of” the two actions. Same does not mean same. The two claims need not be “entirely identical”. He held that the “same does not mean the same” approach also applied to the identity of cause. He further cautioned that an "unintended and undesirable consequence" of allowing "identical" claims would open the door for claimants to have two attempts at the same claim.


The Court of Appeal decision provides helpful guidance on the proper interpretation of Article 27 of the Lugano Convention, even though it no longer applies (for now?) to the UK since the end of the Transition period on 31 December 2020. It remains to be seen whether the EU will accept the UK’s application to become a signatory of the Lugano Convention which would restore a system of rules of jurisdiction and judgements equivalent to an older (2001) version of Brussels I (Recast).

Commentators have pointed out that if the EU accedes to the UK’s request, the regime will differ from Brussels I (Recast) in five key respects1:

i.  the scope of exclusion of arbitration will remain uncertain;

ii.  choice of forum agreements will only be effective if one of the parties is domiciled in a contracting state;

iii.  there will be no scope for staying proceedings in favour of third states where parallel proceedings are already pending, although there may be scope for the controversial practice of disapplying the convention’s strict rules under the so-called “reflexive effect”;

iv.  prior proceedings between the same parties on the same cause of action will take automatic priority, even if the courts of another state have been chosen by a jurisdiction agreement; and

v.  the procedure for recognition and enforcement of judgements will be latest version of the Brussels I (Recast) Regulations.

C. Helice Leasing S.A.S v PT Garuda Indonesia

On 20 January 2021, the English High Court in Helice Leasing S.A.S v PT Garuda Indonesia ruled on the topical issue of whether English court proceedings should be stayed in favour of arbitration proceedings pursuant to the arbitration agreement contained in the contract that is subject to the dispute.

In summary the English Commercial Court held that the court proceedings should be stayed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act 1996 in favour of arbitration under the relevant clause of the contract entered into between the parties.


PT Garuda Indonesia (Persero) TBK (“Garuda”) and Helice Leasing S.A.S (“Helice”) were the lessee and lessor of an Aircraft Operating Lease Novation and Amendment Agreement (the “Lease”). Garuda was in rent arrears, and admitted that it those rents to Helice. As a result of Garuda’s continued non-payment, Helice brought a claim against Garuda in the High Court for non-payment of Basic and Additional Rent as defined in the Lease, as well as an indemnity.

The Court noted that Garuda did not contest the amounts owed and claimed. However, Garuda’s defence focused on three main arguments: (i) the service of the claim form was not valid, not being served in accordance with rule 6.3 of the CPR; (ii) the English Court proceedings have been brought in breach of the parties’ arbitration agreement, and should therefore be stayed for arbitration, pursuant to the arbitration clause set out in the Lease; and (iii) that the most appropriate forum for the resolution of the proceedings is Indonesia, not England.

The Parties’ arguments in relation to the stay of the court proceedings

Helice contended that the proceedings are in respect of a matter which is required to be referred to arbitration pursuant to the Lease which provided that “that any dispute arising out of or in connection with this Lease Agreement, including any question regarding its existence, validity or termination, shall be referred to and finally resolved by arbitration under the Rules of the London Court of International Arbitration (the "LCIA Rules")” (emphasis added).

Garuda disagreed that the proceedings are required to be referred to arbitration pursuant to the Lease which it contends provides an exception to the arbitration agreement, in another article that provided as follows:

“If an Event of Default occurs, and for as long as it shall continue, Lessor may at its option (and without prejudice to any of its other rights under this Lease Agreement or that may arise by operation of Applicable Law), at any time thereafter:

(b) proceed by appropriate court action or actions to enforce performance of this Lease Agreement or to recover damages for the breach of this Lease Agreement;” (emphasis added)

Garuda claims that the above wording allows it to proceed by way of court litigation not arbitration.

In response, Helice argued that “a more reasonable interpretation” of the reference to “court action” in is that this was an erroneous remnant of the original Lessor’s template lease agreement, which seems to have contemplated the law and courts of New York, as evidenced by the reference to New York law in clause 2.1(k) of the Lease Agreement.

The High Court Decision

The judgment was handed down by Calver J who found that hat the parties objectively intended to refer any dispute to arbitration, and the Event of Default Clause (although “not happily worded”) simply set out Helice’s rights if an Event of Default occurred. It also held that due to non-payment by Garuda there was a “dispute” within the meaning of the Arbitration Clause, such that it was engaged in the circumstances. The High Court therefore granted Garuda a stay of proceedings under s9 of the Act in favour of arbitration under the Arbitration Clause.

Finally, the High Court went even further to note that it would have been prepared to correct the Event of Default Clause to read “proceed by way of arbitration under [the Arbitration Clause]”. However, the Court did not consider that it was necessary given its reasons for the construction of the two clauses.


This decision is a prime example of the potentially significant difficulties that could result from conflicting dispute resolution provisions. In order to avoid disputes surrounding the proper forum and having to resort to the courts to determine the intention of the Parties at the time the contract was entered into, it is crucial that particular care is given to the drafting of contracts, and especially the dispute resolution clauses, by avoiding inconsistencies and drafting errors such as the use of the words “court” and “arbitration” interchangeably.

D. AdActive Media Inc v Ingrouille

On 5 March 2021, the English Court of Appeal in AdActive Media Inc v Ingrouille ruled on the relationship between two conflicting dispute resolution provisions contained in the same contract, which provide for either arbitration or US court litigation depending on the cause of action.

In summary the Court of Appeal Court held that where court proceedings in the US had included claims that fell within the arbitration clause, a default judgment obtained in the US could not be enforced in England & Wales.


The dispute arose out of a consultancy agreement between AdActive Media Inc (the “Company”), incorporated in Delaware, and Mark Ingrouille, a British citizen resident in England. Pursuant to the consultancy agreement, Mr Ingrouille was hired to provide services as part of the expansion of the Company's business in South East Asia.

The consultancy agreement is governed by the law of the State of California (clause 15). It also contains three provisions dealing with jurisdiction, two of which confer jurisdiction on US District (clause 16) and State Courts in California and the other provides for arbitration (clause 17). The provision for arbitration expressly excludes claims by the company under two clauses, one of which (clause 7) contains covenants against the misuse and unauthorised disclosure of confidential information.

The Company terminated the agreement and commenced US proceedings against Mr Ingrouille, claiming damages for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, embezzlement, interference with contractual relations and interference with economic advantage. The United States District Court for the Central District of California issued a judgment for US$11 million, which the Company sought to enforce in England & Wales.

By an order, dated 21 July 2020, Judge Russen QC, sitting as a judge of the High Court, gave judgment under CPR Part 24 for £8,483,726.67, being the sterling equivalent of $11 million. He held that the proceedings were properly brought in the US Court in accordance with the clauses conferring jurisdiction on that court because, even if the arbitration clause was effective, it did not exclude the US Court's jurisdiction if the proceedings included claims in respect of the misuse or unauthorised disclosure of confidential information. He also found that the arbitration clause was unenforceable within the meaning of section 32(2) because it was irreconcilable with the other jurisdiction clauses.

Mr Ingrouille appealed the High Court’s order for summary judgement by way of enforcement. The relationship between the conflicted dispute resolution provisions and their effect is one of central issues arising on Mr Ingrouille’s appeal.

The Court of Appeal’s Decision

The Court of Appeal embarked on a two-step analysis to determine whether the US proceedings fell within the scope of the arbitration clause of the consultancy agreement (clause 17): (i) it first considered whether clause 17 created an effective arbitration provision; and (ii) if so, whether clause 17 applied to the dispute litigated before the US courts.

In relation to the first limb of the analysis, the Court of Appeal held that the starting point in considering whether an express term of a contract was ineffective is that the parties will be presumed to have intended the entire contract to take effect. If a term was ineffective because of an irreconcilable conflict with other express terms of the contract, it could be assumed that the parties did not intend to create that situation.

With reference to Enka Insaat Ve Sanayi AS v OOO Insurance Company Chubb [2020] UKSC 38, [2020] 1 W.L.R. 4117, [2020] 10 WLUK 70, the Court of Appeal held that it is necessary to examine with care the precise drafting of the provisions before determining that a conflict existed and courts would strive to avoid the conclusion that a provision could not, as a matter of construction, take effect. Clauses 15 to 17 of the consultancy agreement all dealt with governing law and jurisdiction. Given that they were grouped together in that way, the possibility of an inconsistency was objectively more improbable than if they appeared in separate and unrelated parts of the agreement. The Court of Appeal also found that the structure and the wording of these clauses provided for consistency rather than the reverse. As a result, the Appeal Judges found that the High Court erred in holding otherwise and that clause 17 was an effective arbitration provision.

In relation to the issue as to whether clause 17 applied to the dispute raised in the US proceedings, the Court of Appeal held that it was the bringing of the proceedings in breach of the relevant agreement which prevented the English court from recognising or enforcing any judgment obtained in foreign proceedings. The focus was on the breach of the agreement and it was therefore the claims as formulated by the claimant in the foreign proceedings, not the terms of the judgment, which had to be analysed. The Court of Appeal found that the claims in the US proceedings had gone beyond the scope of the causes of action described under clauses 7 and 8 and which are permitted to be made to the US courts, and therefore could not be enforced in England & Wales.


The main takeaway from this case is that if the same contract provides for two different types of dispute resolution forums (arbitration being the main dispute resolution forum and court litigation for a limited number of cause of actions), absent a clear and concise delimitation between the causes of action, the English Courts will adopt a pro-arbitration stance and will not shy away from refusing the enforcement of decisions of foreign courts that it believes fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement. Parties should give particular care to the drafting their dispute resolution clauses and avoid multiple forums in the same contract to avoid lengthy arguments as to the valid dispute resolution forum and related wasted time and cost if it later transpires that it chose to litigate its dispute before the wrong forum.

II. Conclusion

There has been much doubt and uncertainty about the English Courts’ approach to jurisdiction and enforcement after the end of the Brexit Implementation Period. The decisions examined in this article show that the Courts of England & Wales continue to: (i) strictly interpret rules governing its jurisdiction by not shying away from asserting its jurisdiction (e.g. in cases of parallel proceedings in another EEA member State where there is not a strict identity of cause and object between the two claims); and (ii) adopt a pro-arbitration stance, especially in cases of conflicting dispute resolution clauses, even if the result of such approach is to refuse the enforcement of judgements issued by foreign courts which found that they had jurisdiction over the underlying dispute.

Despite the lack of clarity as to the future membership of the UK to the Lugano Convention 2007, English Courts will remain an attractive forum for dispute resolution, even after Brexit, given the consistency in its approach to issues of jurisdiction and enforcement.

To find out more about Eversheds Sutherland’s expertise and online material as regards to how UK and EU courts will treat issues pertaining to jurisdiction and enforcement post-Brexit – click here.

[1] Alexander Layton QC & Andrew Dinsmore, Cross-border civil litigation: the new normal, New Law Journal, 26 February 2021.


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