Capacity to Marry
November 21, 2025
Capacity to MarryNovember 21, 2025 “The law must protect, but it must also empower.” – The Irish Court has affirmed the rights of those with Cognitive Impairments and their Capacity to Marry In the first decision of its kind in Ireland. On 4 November 2025 Justice Geoffrey Shannon delivered a Judgment in the matter of Part 5 of the Assisted Decision Making (Capacity) Act 2015, as amended. Involving AB, The Relevant Person. A Residential Centre, the Applicant, and CD, the Notice Party. The Applicant sought a declaration under section 37(1)(b) of the 2015 Act that the Relevant Person lacked capacity to enter into marriage. This was the first opportunity the Irish Courts have had to set the standard for determining capacity in this context. In essence, this case was brought to protect the interests of the Relevant Person who had an intellectual disability and who was being cared for by the Applicant after the death of his parents. The Relevant Person was in a committed relationship with the Notice Party for over 20 years and they had both expressed a wish to marry. The Notice Party also has an intellectual disability but lives independently with supports in place. It was before Mr Justice Shannon to decide whether the Relevant Person lacked capacity to enter into Marriage and the weight of this decision was not lost on the Court. This matter was subject to previous litigation and the High Court granted an interim injunction restraining the Relevant Person from participating in any marriage ceremony. That order remained in place for a number of years until it was vacated by the High Court, subject to a stay pending the outcome of these proceedings. The Relevant Party and Notice Party had a celebration of their relationship while they could not legally marry due to the pending proceedings. The Relevant Person refers to the Notice Party as his Wife. The Applicant’s Argument
The Applicant submitted that the application was made with due regard to the Relevant Person’s rights, but also in accordance with the statutory obligation to ensure that marriage is entered into with informed consent. The Applicant submitted that it has always supported the relationship between the Relevant Person and the Notice Party, but that the evidence before the Court necessitates intervention to protect the Relevant Person from entering into a marriage he does not fully understand. The applicants submissions were supported by two expert witnesses who both agreed Mr AB lacked the requisite capacity to marry. The Relevant Person’s ArgumentThe Relevant Person opposed the application, arguing that it would interfere with the constitutionally protected right to marry, which he wished to exercise with the Notice Party. His Counsel, Mr. Declan Higgins BL, stressed that the proposed orders would have profound consequences for both parties, affecting a long-standing, affectionate relationship of over two decades. The Relevant Person views marriage as a meaningful institution and questioned why he is treated differently from others. Counsel challenged the adequacy of the assessments relied upon by the Applicant, claiming they imposed an unrealistic standard of understanding, while the law requires only a minimal threshold for consent to marriage. He also criticised the lack of evidence of structured supports to help the Relevant Person understand marriage and disputed references to “learned” or “rehearsed” responses and unsubstantiated claims of undue influence. Counsel argued, the case invokes Articles 8 and 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights, protecting private and family life and the right to marry. Counsel argued that granting the application would extinguish a fundamental right and deny recognition to a committed relationship. The Relevant Person urged the Court to reject the application and affirm his right to marry, respecting his will, preference, and constitutional and Convention-based protections. The Notice Party’s ArgumentThe Notice Party opposed the application, arguing that the legal test for capacity to marry has been misapplied and that the medical evidence is procedurally flawed, failing to respect statutory, constitutional, and Convention rights. Counsel, Ms. Emma Slattery BL, contended that the assessments by Dr. EF and Dr. GH did not comply with the 2015 Act or the Decision Support Service Code of Practice. She highlighted that the assessments lacked relevant information, did not use all practicable supports, and adopted an abstract, overly complex view of marriage, which risks setting an unreasonably high threshold and discriminating against persons with intellectual disabilities. Counsel identified six key issues for the Court, including the correct legal test, its application, the Relevant Person’s capacity, the role of will and preference, human rights implications, and appropriate relief. She emphasizes the depth and resilience of the parties’ longstanding, exclusive relationship and criticised reliance on clinical snapshots rather than holistic understanding. The Applicant, she argued, has not proven incapacity or shown that all supportive measures were exhausted. The Notice Party asserted that the orders sought would disproportionately interfere with fundamental rights and that the evidence does not justify a finding of incapacity. The Court’s ConsiderationsThe Court acknowledged this decision would be “narrow in scope but significant in consequence”. The Court took a detailed look at the 2015 act, the rights afforded to us under the Constitution of Ireland, The European Convention of Human Rights, UK & Irish Jurisprudence, and significantly, the voice of the parties whom this decision will effect. The Court carefully considered the oral and written evidence put forward by the experts. Notably, the Court in assessing the institution of Marriage and who can enter into it opined: “In considering the public interest, the Court must be vigilant not to impose a threshold for capacity that is so exacting as to exclude individuals with intellectual disabilities from the right to marry. The law must strike a careful balance, protecting those who may not comprehend the nature of the marital commitment, while ensuring that the test for capacity does not become a discriminatory barrier to the exercise of a fundamental right. The jurisprudence of England and Wales, particularly Sheffield City Council v. E. [2004] EWHC 2808 (Fam), has emphasised that the test for capacity to marry is intentionally low. It requires only a rudimentary understanding of the nature of the marriage contract and the responsibilities it entails. This approach reflects a public policy imperative: that individuals of limited or borderline capacity should not be unfairly excluded from the enriching experience of marriage, provided they possess the requisite understanding. In the Irish context, as stated above, this principle is reinforced by the constitutional protection afforded to marriage under Article 41.3.1° of the Constitution, which pledges the State to guard the institution of marriage with special care. The 2015 Act further supports this approach by mandating a functional, decision-specific assessment of capacity, and by requiring that all practicable steps be taken to support the individual in making the decision. The public interest is not served by a blanket exclusion of persons with cognitive impairments from marriage. Rather, it is served by a legal framework that ensures informed consent, respects autonomy, and promotes inclusion. The Court must therefore ensure that its application of the statutory test does not inadvertently operate as a barrier to the exercise of a constitutionally protected right.” The court acknowledged that at present, “there is no definitive test articulated by the Irish courts for assessing capacity to marry. While Irish jurisprudence has addressed the issue in the context of nullity, these cases have not crystallized into a clear, standalone test applicable in broader contexts.” The Court put forward a test for determining capacity to enter Marriage:
As noted by the Court the test reflects a low threshold and is designed to safeguard autonomy while ensuring informed consent. The Courts FindingsThe declaration sought was highly significant as it concerned whether the Relevant Person lacked capacity to consent to marriage. If granted, it would create a legal impediment under section 58 of the 2004 Act (as amended by the 2015 Act), rendering the marriage void. Such an order would not only have serious legal consequences but also deeply intrude on personal autonomy and private life, effectively denying a fundamental right protected by the Constitution (Articles 40.3.1° and 41.3.1°) and Article 12 of the ECHR. The Court acknowledged that any interference with the right to marry must be justified by clear and cogent evidence. The Court also considered the broader implications for persons with intellectual disabilities, stressing that the legal threshold for capacity must remain functional and decision-specific to avoid indirect discrimination. The Relevant Person and Notice Party have been in a committed, loving relationship for over twenty years, consistently expressing a mutual wish to marry despite prolonged litigation. The sincerity and resilience of their relationship are undisputed, and the Court approached the matter with caution, mindful of principles of autonomy, dignity, and equality before the law. The Court affirmed that the right to marry is a fundamental constitutional and human right and proposed a four-part test for capacity to marry: the person must understand the nature of marriage, appreciate its duties and responsibilities, recognize its potential consequences, and give full, free, and informed consent. This test aligns with the functional approach under the 2015 Act and the Decision Support Service Code, ensuring autonomy while safeguarding informed decision-making. The presumption of capacity under section 8(2) of the 2015 Act applies unless proven otherwise, and section 8(3) requires that all practicable steps to support decision-making be exhausted before concluding incapacity. The Court emphasised that compliance with the Code is mandatory, requiring assessors to provide all relevant information and supports to enable participation in decision-making. While expert evidence from Dr. EF and Dr. GH concluded that the Relevant Person lacks capacity, the Court acknowledged their professionalism and the challenges posed by the absence of precedent under the new statutory framework. The Court recognised the complexity and sensitivity of the issue, noting the importance of adhering to rights-based principles throughout the assessment process. The Court found that the expert assessments did not comply with the statutory requirements of the 2015 Act or the Decision Support Service Code. Specifically, they failed to clearly identify relevant information about marriage at the outset, did not demonstrate that all practicable steps were taken to support the Relevant Person’s understanding, and lacked an iterative or educative process. There was no evidence of repeated opportunities, varied formats, or ongoing efforts to test and build understanding over time. Section 8(7) of the 2015 Act, which requires interventions to facilitate participation and respect the Relevant Person’s will and preferences, was highlighted as a core principle. Despite the experts’ efforts, the Court was not satisfied that these obligations were met, emphasizing that the process should have been rights-based and supportive rather than static. Both experts acknowledged the Relevant Person’s longstanding relationship and wish to marry the Notice Party, but the Court found no evidence of structured efforts to support his understanding of marriage before the assessments. The assessments appeared to interpret his repeated expressions of love as limited comprehension rather than genuine will and preference. Without tailored supports or iterative engagement, the Court was not satisfied that his understanding was adequately explored or could not have been enhanced through appropriate interventions. The Court emphasized that the 2015 Act aims to uphold autonomy, dignity, and equality, requiring a functional, decision-specific approach rather than an overly restrictive standard. There was no evidence of coercion or undue influence, and the Relevant Person’s wish to marry was deemed genuine and freely expressed. The Court found the presumption of capacity under section 8(2) of the 2015 Act was not rebutted, and granting the declaration would disproportionately interfere with constitutional and human rights. Accordingly, the Court declined to make the declaration sought. In concluding the Courts Findings, Mr Justice Shannon remarked: “The 2015 Act is not merely a procedural reform. It is a statement of values which affirms that individuals with cognitive impairments are entitled to support, respect and the presumption of capacity.” This decision is the first of its kind in Ireland and sets a firm precedence as to the test for determining capacity to marry. The Court took careful consideration in coming to its decision and ensured the interests of the public and the interests of the Relevant Person in this case were balanced and equally protected. While there is no dispute that the application was brought in the best interests of the Relevant Person, the finding of the Court is clear in the weight given to the presumption of capacity. The Court’s decision emphasises the burden of proving incapacity is high, and one which must be overcome with evidence which has a clear structured rights based approach engaging in extensive exploration of the parties understanding. Key contacts
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