Date for assessing damages in UK cryptocurrency disputes
Date for assessing damages in cryptocurrency disputes (England & Wales)
September 19, 2024
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
Abstract
Southgate v Graham [2024] EWHC 1692 is an appealed County Court decision concerning whether the valuation of a damages claim should be assessed at the date of breach or at the date of judgment (or some other date), specifically in instances of unsecured lending of cryptocurrencies.
The County Court refused to grant specific performance of the contractual arrangement between the parties, namely for the return of cryptocurrency plus a 10% premium. A separate finding of the County Court indicated that damages should be valued as at the date of breach.
The finding on the valuation date was firmly disputed by the Appellant because the value of the cryptocurrency was significantly higher by the date of judgment.
The High Court allowed the appeal on the question of the correct valuation date only. The High Court considered that the Appellant’s arguments for a different valuation date had real merit. Crucially, however, no final determination was made as to the timing of valuation. This is to be considered at a future remedies hearing. The issue remains unclarified, and will be fact sensitive, limiting the read-across to other matters.
Background:
Mr Southgate (the “Appellant”) and Mr Graham (the “Respondent”) entered into an oral agreement (the "Agreement") pursuant to which the Appellant loan cryptocurrency to the Respondent in the form of 144 Ethereum tokens (the “Ethereum”) sent in two tranches on 7 and 13 June 2018. The Respondent was to repay the Appellant within a reasonable time period following the Appellant’s written demand.
At first instance, the key issue in dispute was whether the Agreement required repayment of the Ethereum plus a 10% premium (as the Appellant alleged), or whether the Respondent had instead agreed to repay the equivalent GBP value of the Ethereum as at the time of the Agreement (c.£50,000) plus 10% (as the Respondent argued).
This question was important because Ethereum’s value had fluctuated upwards significantly and depending on the dates chosen, by as much as ten times.
The decision in the County Court:
At trial, the Appellant sought specific performance of the Agreement and/or damages in lieu of specific performance.
His Honour Judge Saggerson found that:
the Agreement required the repayment of the Ethereum, not its GBP equivalent;
there had been a breach of the Agreement;
the repayment was due “within a reasonable time of demand”, approximately 3 months after the Appellant’s demand. This left 115.69 ETH outstanding, as the Respondent had re-paid £6,000 in September 2019.
However, HHJ Saggerson refused to grant an order for specific performance of the Agreement, instead awarding damages in lieu, to be assessed at a later hearing. As specific performance is a discretionary remedy, HHJ Saggerson refused to grant it, holding that such an order would ”set the Respondent up to fail”. The Respondent would not be able to purchase the outstanding Ethereum within a reasonable time. This might lead to a penal notice (such as contempt of court proceedings), which “would be unfair, disproportionate and unnecessary”.
Significantly, in advance of the remedies hearing, a recital to HHJ Saggerson’s trial order recorded that the assessment “must be based upon the value of the 115.69 Ethereum tokens as of midday, 1 October 2019” i.e. the date of the breach. The Appellant had pleaded that damages ought to be assessed as at the date of judgment. Given the increase in value of Ethereum, this would be significantly more beneficial to the Appellant.
The Appellant appealed the decision of HHJ Saggerson on two main grounds, namely that:
HHJ Saggerson was wrong to refuse specific performance; or
in the alternative, HHJ Saggerson was wrong to direct that the valuation date for an assessment of damages should be the date of breach of the Agreement.
The decision in the High Court:
Mr Justice Trower dismissed the appeal in respect of specific performance, describing it as an “equitable remedy [which was] discretionary (and sometimes…exceptional)”.
On the one hand, there was “no reason to think that a contract for the return of cryptocurrency tokens might not be specifically performable in an appropriate case”. There is “nothing special about a contract to transfer cryptocurrency by reason of the asset concerned".
However, Trower J was not satisfied that it was “plainly wrong” for HHJ Saggerson to refuse specific performance. This was the required threshold for an appeal court to interfere with primary factual findings, or an evaluation of those findings.
As to the question of the correct valuation date, it was “wrong [for HHJ Saggerson] to reach a settled view”. Although it was appropriate for HHJ Saggerson to order a remedies hearing, it was premature to decide the appropriate valuation date in advance of that hearing. As noted during the course of Trower J’s judgment, the parties had neither expected nor been prepared to make submissions on this issue at trial in advance of the remedies hearing. Additionally, the relevant evidence was not before the court.
Trower J found that the Appellant’s arguments for a date of valuation “other than the date of breach” “appear[ed] to have real merit”. Without making “a final determination”, Trower J provided reasons “in outline” as follows:
1. Although adopting the date of breach "is often thought to be the general rule when valuing loss caused by a breach of a contract,” Trower J confirmed by reference to his analysis of the authorities that this “rule should not be rigidly applied”.
2. It is important that the wronged party is adequately compensated by being placed in the same position he would have been had the contract been performed. Where that cannot be achieved “it may be necessary to adopt another approach”. On the facts, assessing damages at the date of breach would leave the Appellant “significantly out of pocket” because of the increase in Ethereum’s value. In these circumstances, the important question was whether the Respondent is “not liable for this particular shortfall”. This required application of legal principles including remoteness of damage, and/or the Appellant’s duty to mitigate his loss. Properly assessed, a court might be able to identify an alternative valuation date which could sit between the date of breach and date of judgment.
3. It was of “central relevance that the [Agreement] was not for the purchase of ETH at a price that remained unpaid”. Rather, the Agreement was for the transfer by the Appellant to the Respondent of the Ethereum. In return, the re-transfer of the Ethereum plus 10%. The Agreement was more akin to a loan than a contract for sale. In those circumstances, the Appellant might credibly argue that he was under “no obligation, or in any event a more limited obligation” to mitigate his loss by purchasing Ethereum on the open market. The Appellant had already provided “full consideration” to the Respondent when loaning the Ethereum. Purchasing Ethereum on the open market as mitigation would therefore require him to pay twice.
4. Trower J referenced potentially analogous cases concerning stock lending or foreign currency exchange agreements “which may bear on the right answer”. For those cases, the correct approach is to apply the value as at the date of judgment – essentially comprising the market value at the date of breach topped up with additional damages for consequential loss.
5. By reference to the Appellant’s “second main…argument”, it was also considered that section 50 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 might be engaged on the facts. That provision conveys a discretionary power on a court to award damages in addition to, or in substitution for, specific performance whenever the court has jurisdiction to entertain an application for that relief. By reference to passages of Lord Wilberforce from the House of Lords decision in Johnson v Agnew, it was arguable that so long as the claimant has acted reasonably in their pursuit of the specific performance remedy, damages should be assessed at the date specific performance no longer became available (i.e. when it was refused at the date of judgment). Section 50 damages are a money equivalent to what is lost by the refusal of specific performance. Trower J considered that the principles in Johnson v Agnew supported the Appellant’s arguments.
Trower J therefore allowed the appeal on the valuation date issue, and ordered it to be considered at the remedies hearing, with appropriate directions for evidence. He confirmed that “it remains open” for HHJ Saggerson to make appropriate factual findings at the remedies hearing. Despite his apparent support for the Appellant’s position, Trower J did state that it may not have been reasonable for the Appellant to have pressed for specific performance throughout the proceedings, and this was “intimately interlinked” with arguments on mitigation of loss.
Analysis:
The increasing commonality of cryptocurrency being loaned creates novel issues for the courts. Cryptocurrency is a uniquely volatile asset – made even more so due to the fact that it is traded and exchanged as currency. Significant fluctuations in the value of cryptocurrencies is likely to result in more satellite litigation as claimants seek orders for damages that are more beneficial to them. The need for expansive remedies hearings, supported by evidence, could unnecessarily increase costs. In Southgate, Trower J saw those increased costs as “an inevitable consequence of the nature of the issues which arise”. The correct valuation date for damages is just one of many issues that the courts are having to grapple with as a result of cryptocurrency’s rise in popularity.
It is however important to recognise the potentially self-contained impact of this case. As Trower J noted, the case law authorities have consistently applied the “general date of breach rule” of valuing a damages claim as at the date of the breach. In the House of Lords’ decision in Golden Strait , Lord Scott stated that “the assessment at the date of breach rule can usually achieve the result [of placing the claimant back into their original position]”. Although the general rule can be displaced, this will be as an exception and where the facts and evidence allows. The court seeks wherever possible to achieve a just outcome which adequately compensates the injured party. It is clear that this is heavily fact dependent. The answer might also be different depending on the performance of the cryptocurrency, which could result in all manner of outcomes in different cases.
It is also important to note that no final determination has been made in Southgate. Trower J’s comments were made without the benefit of evidence which will be available at the final remedies hearing. Whatever decision is made will be a non-binding county court decision.
There are no doubt a number of complex issues for the Court to consider at the remedies hearing, but this is a significant issue which is likely to require clarity from the higher courts at some stage.
The materials on the Eversheds Sutherland website are for general information purposes only and do not constitute legal advice. While reasonable care is taken to ensure accuracy, the materials may not reflect the most current legal developments. Eversheds Sutherland disclaims liability for actions taken based on the materials. Always consult a qualified lawyer for specific legal matters. To view the full disclaimer, see our Terms and Conditions or Disclaimer section in the footer. Eversheds Sutherland is a provider of legal and other services operating through various separate and distinct legal entities. For further information about these entities and Eversheds Sutherlands' structure please see the Legal Notice page of this website.